An Employees Right to Disconnect After Working Hours

A common complaint from employees (and their family and friends) is that they cannot seem to get away from work, even after they’ve left the office to go home at night. Technology has allowed many individuals to take their work home with them, which was only been exacerbated by the pandemic because so many people were, and continue to work from home. The office boundary lines have now become significantly blurred regardless of the employment contract signed.

Employees who work from home may see emails come in after their work day is complete, yet feel like it would be irresponsible for them not to reply. They may feel their employer expects them to complete tasks such as replying to emails because it’s easily accessible from their fingertips. So what rights do employees have when it comes to disconnecting after working hours? It’s an important and highly relevant employment question in today’s society. As of June 2nd, 2022, the Working for Workers Act came into effect, which provided some guidance on the issue.

What Does the Statute Say?

So what exactly does the Working for Workers Act say? Firstly, it defines “disconnecting from work” as ‘not engaging in work-related communications, including emails, telephone calls, video calls or the sending or reviewing of other messages, so as to be free from the performance of work.’ For example, if a superior or a co-worker sends an email at night regarding a work task of some sort, this is specifically covered under this piece of legislation.

The statute also states that any employer with 25 or more employees must ensure it has a written policy in place for all company employees with respect to disconnecting from work. A copy of this written policy must also be provided to all current and future employees. Any change made to the policy must also then be communicated to the employees. This means companies with 10 employees, for instance, are not covered by this particular law.

What Does this Mean for Employees?

Interestingly enough, the most significant aspect of this legislation is actually nothing that is included in it. Yes, the Working for Workers Act defines work-related activities broadly, which is helpful for employees. Yes, the Act also states that companies with more than 25 employees must have a written policy in place. However, it does not mandate what hours are to be considered non-working. Therefore, the policy can simply state between only 11:00 pm and 11:59 pm, employees are free to disconnect from work. As such, it would be permissible for the employer to expect answers on emails and other communications outside of that 59-minute range, even though it may be after 5 pm. Moreover, it does not help employees who work at smaller companies (less than 25 employees) as they do not even get the benefit of a written policy on disconnecting from work.

Essentially, the Act merely requires a written policy to be created only by employers of a certain size but does not explicitly outline what the required policy should state.

The Main Takeaway

This Working for Workers Act is lacking the teeth that many people think it might have when they hear about the new law on the news. For all intents and purposes, it does not actually provide employees with much more protection than they had before June 2nd, 2022.

The Consequences of Bad Behaviour for Cost Awards

It is fair to assume that if one behaves poorly, their actions are more likely going to result in poor consequences. In the legal realm, courts can penalize parties for their bad behaviour with cost decisions. This was perfectly exemplified in the Gracias v. Dr. David Walt Dentistry decision released on July 12, 2022.

Gracias v. Dr. David Walt Dentistry: The Facts

The Plaintiff, Sonia Gracias, was dismissed without cause from her job as a dental hygienist with the Defendant, Dr. David Walt Dentistry Professional Corporation (“Walt Dentistry”). As a result, she sued Walt Dentistry for: (a) $50,000 in damages for discrimination for contraventions of the Ontario Human Rights Code; (b) $50,000 for common law damages for wrongful dismissal; and (c) $50,000 in punitive damages.

Walt Dentistry denied the human rights discrimination claim and also pleaded that it could have fired Ms. Gracias for egregious employee misconduct. In other words, The Defendant is alleging Ms. Gracias engaged in conduct that could have resulted in her termination for cause.

Following examinations for discovery, Ms. Gracias abandoned her human rights claim (without substantiating the allegations) and claim for punitive damages. Only a wrongful dismissal claim for a 7-month notice period compensation remained. The Plaintiff believed she was entitled to common law damages in lieu of notice because the employment contract unlawfully contracted out of the Employment Standards Act. Likewise, Walt Dentistry amended the Statement of Defence, abandoning the allegation of employee misconduct. The Defendant’s main argument was that the terms of her employment contract barred Ms. Gracias from claiming more than her Employment Standards Act entitlements.

Both Sides Behaved Poorly

Justice Perell described the two sides as dogs released in a litigation war. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were going for each other’s jugular. The persistently poor behaviour Ms. Gracias and Walt Dentistry engaged in was outlined by the court.

The following is a summary of the Plaintiff’s poor behaviour:

  1.  Gracias made very serious allegations of Ontario Human Rights Code violations without substantiating them whatsoever;
  2.  Gracias ultimately received an award of $17,587. This amount is within the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court (under $25,000), which means the Court may order that the Plaintiff shall not recover any costs. Yet, she still asked for partial indemnity costs of approximately $35,000; and
  3.  Gracias did not take her important responsibilities to produce documents and answer undertakings seriously.

The following is a summary of the Defendant’s poor behaviour:

  1.  Walt Dentistry submitted that Ms. Gracias falsified her evidence of mitigation efforts with fabricated records of the job applications she made over the internet. The Defendant provided no evidence of this;
  2.  Walt Dentistry “had the nerve” to request its costs be paid in the amount of $17,387.88, which would have essentially ‘set-off’ the award to Ms. Gracias; and
  3.  Walt Dentistry alleged that Ms. Gracias engaged in egregious misconduct worthy of termination with cause, without providing any evidence of this.

The Order and Main Takeaway

Justice Perell was unimpressed with the behaviour of the two sides. As a result of their actions, he decided it was appropriate that there should be no order as to costs.

The language Justice Perell used to describe the parties behaviour gave a clear indication of his feelings. Language such as ‘releasing the dogs of litigation’, ‘going for the jugular’, ‘chutzpah’, ‘audacity’, ‘gall’, and ‘the nerve’, make it evident that the actions of both parties were unacceptable.

As one can see, there are serious consequences for nonsense allegations and other poor conduct that parties may attempt to use in order to raise potential damages awards. Both clients and lawyers should keep this in mind while moving through litigation process.

Recent Arbitrator Decision on Two-Dose Vaccination Policy in the Workplace

As Canada continues to move further away from the worst of the pandemic, it is likely some employers may begin to remove mandatory vaccination policies. Originally, they were put in place to prevent the spread of a potentially deadly disease in the workplace, providing employees with an added layer of protection. You can read more about decisions regarding vaccination policies herehereherehere, and here. However, even in the case of a mandatory vaccination policy currently remaining in place, there is a new decision regarding the reasonableness of such a policy. This is one of many decisions on the issue, with most outcomes favouring vaccination policies being reasonable.

FCA Canada Inc. v Unifor, Locals 195, 444, 1285: The Facts

On October 14, 2021, FCA Canada released their policy regarding the COVID-19 vaccination and employment contracts. The Policy – which was supported by the union at the time – made it mandatory for all employees to be fully vaccinated, which was defined as receiving two doses of an approved COVID-19 vaccine. Proof of being fully vaccinated was also required. This Policy was created based on scientific evidence and with the help of legal personnel. Moreover, by October of 2021, vaccines had already been readily available for multiple months. The first section of the Policy made reference to the Employers’ statutory obligation under the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act (“OHSA”) to take “every precaution reasonable in the circumstance” to provide a safe environment for employees and visitors, which includes against deadly viruses such as COVID-19.

Between October 26 and November 12, 2021, numerous communications were made by the employer to the employees which set out the expectations of the policy and relevant dates. The employer also shared various educational resources and information with the remaining unvaccinated employees.

As of December 31, 2021, those employees who chose not to receive the vaccine, and thus not to comply with the policy, were placed on unpaid leave.

The Arbitrators Decision: Two-Dose Vaccination Policy No Longer Reasonable

On June 17, 2022, Arbitrator Nairn held that the two-dose vaccination policy was no longer reasonable as the scientific evidence had evolved to the point where two doses of the vaccine no longer proved to effectively reduce the spread of the virus in its current state. The mutated version of COVID-19, known as the Omicron variant has resulted in a lesser degree of effectiveness at preventing infection and transmission. Its effectiveness also severely wanes after multiple weeks. Thus, requiring employees to be fully vaccinated was no longer considered reasonable. Moreover, the Arbitrator also stated that the Policy lacked a periodic review mechanism, which would allow for the Employer to change its policy based on the most up-to-date scientific evidence. For instance, as of December 2021, when the employees were first placed on unpaid leave, the Policy was still reasonable based on the characteristics of the virus, and how the Policy was still effective at reducing spread and providing a layer of security. Arbitrator Nairn notes that having a mechanism in place for reviewing the Policy’s merits based on the relevant scientific evidence, would have better positioned them to achieve the reasonable standard for their Policy.

While this is just one decision that states a two-dose vaccination policy is not reasonable, it is highly relevant due to the recency of the decision.

LINKS:

https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onla/doc/2022/2022canlii52913/2022canlii52913.html

Reinstatement or Compensation in Lieu

The presumptive remedy for unjust dismissal is reinstatement with back pay. When tackling the appropriate remedy to award, adjudicators begin with reinstatement with back pay. Depending on the facts of the case, returning the employee to the workplace is the option unless there are circumstances in which it will not be ideal for either the employee or the employer to continue their employment relationship. There are also situations where neither party wants to reunite in the workplace. As we’ll see from the following decision, the facts of the situation can result in an adjudicator deciding it is best to award compensation in lieu of reinstatement rather than requiring the employee to return to work.

Hussey v. Bell Mobility Inc.: The Facts

Ms. Hussey was an employee with Bell’s Virgin Mobile division beginning in September of 2010 where she was a sales representative in one of its Toronto locations. She was promoted twice in her time with Bell. Ms. Hussey was ultimately dismissed in June of 2017, shortly after her second promotion.

While employed with Bell, Ms. Hussey would often arrive late for her shifts and leave early. Due to this issue, Bell provided Ms. Hussey with her one and only written warning in November of 2016 – before she had received her first promotion to a managerial position. However, she maintained her lax approach to the company requirements even after her written warning. Nonetheless, she was still promoted again to her final role at Bell before ultimately being dismissed following staff complaints about her.

Adjudicator Decision to Award Compensation in Lieu of Reinstatement

In 2020, the Federal Court held that Ms. Hussey was unjustly dismissed from her employment with Bell Mobility. However, adjudicator McNamee decided against reinstating the employee to her position with back pay. Instead, he awarded her compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

The adjudicator decided against reinstating her because Ms. Hussey showed a lack of remorse for her actions and felt it was highly probable she would repeat her bad behaviour. During her cross-examination, she continuously made excuses for her behavior, and in the view of the adjudicator, it was merely an attempt to avoid responsibility for her actions. Therefore, the adjudicator did not feel it would be beneficial to reinstate Ms. Hussey.

Once it was determined reinstatement was not appropriate, the next issue dealt with was damages in lieu of reinstatement. Ms. Hussey urged the Adjudicator to adopt the “fixed term approach” which means that the damages are calculated based on the assumption that the ‘dismissed employee would, if not for dismissal, have continued to work for the company from the date of their discharge to their expected retirement.’ This figure combined with a deduction for reasons such as the employee being dismissed again or leaving employment early for health reasons ultimately results in a range of 80-90%. However, he considered the fixed term approach too speculative and “at best an informed guess.” Yet, the Adjudicator did accept the basic premise of the fixed term approach that if an employee is reinstated, they would receive the benefit of the just cause protection under section 240 of the Canada Labour Code. This would then be factored into the damages calculation. As a result, she received 4 months of compensation for this protection as well as 8 months’ pay due to her length of service, salary and benefits at Bell.

Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal

When it was brought to the Federal Court for judicial review in 2020, the Court found no issue with the decision of the adjudicator. The Federal Court of Appeal also reviewed the case and concurred with the decision.

LINKS:

https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2020/2020fc795/2020fc795.html

https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2022/2022fca95/2022fca95.html?autocompleteStr=Hussey%20v%20Bell%20Mobility%20(%202022%20FCA%2095)&autocompletePos=1#document

Non-Compete Provision Upheld Notwithstanding Working for Workers Act, 2021

In November 2021, the Ontario government passed the Working for Workers Act, 2021, new legislation that, among other things, prohibits non-competition clauses in employment agreements. However, a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court revealed a reluctance to apply the prohibition to non-compete clauses that already exist.

Parekh et al v. Schecter et al The Facts

The Plaintiffs, in this case, are a dentistry where the Defendants used to work. The Defendants entered into an employment contract in 2020, known as an Associate Agreement, which contained restrictive covenants included a non-competition clause. The clause stated:

Non-Competition. The Associate shall not during the Term of this Agreement and for two (2) years thereafter, either directly or indirectly, whether as a proprietor, partner, shareholder, employee, associate or otherwise, carry on or be engaged in the practice of dentistry anywhere within a five (5) kilometre radius of the Premises.

Consequently, the Defendants could not work at another dentistry within a five (5) kilometre radius of the Plaintiff’s business.

In 2021, one of the Defendants resigned and began working at different dentistry. However, this new dentistry actually fell within the prohibited 5 km radius of the Plaintiff’s business. There, the Defendant had violated the non-competition term of the employment contract and the Plaintiffs sought to have it enforced by means of an injunction.

Should the Non-Competition Clause be Enforced?

The trial judge began by addressing the effect of the Working for Workers Act, 2021. This new piece of legislation added the following provision to the Ontario Employment Standards Act:

67.2 (1) No employer shall enter into an employment contract or other agreement with an employee that is, or that includes a non-compete agreement.

The Employment Standards Act further defines non-compete agreements as:

an agreement, or any part of an agreement, between an employer and an employee that prohibits the employee from engaging in any business, work, occupation, profession, project or other activity that is in competition with the employer’s business after the employment relationship between the employee and the employer ends.

In this case, the Defendants argued that the above statutory prohibition of non-competition agreements invalidated the non-competition clause of the Associate Agreement. The Defendant argued the legislation applies retroactively, such that non-competition agreements that existed prior to the legislation being enacted are likewise invalidated by the legislation.

However, the trial judge disagreed, suggesting that the Defendant confused the terms “retroactivity” with “retrospectivity.” Retroactive statutes operate at a time prior to their enactment (operating backwards), whereas retrospective statutes operate for the future only (operating forwards). Thus, their effect is prospective. The Defendant used the term “retroactive”, although the trial judge believed they meant to say “retrospective”.

Regardless of which is the proper characterization, it was the trial judge’s opinion that “the legislation does not apply to void the non-compete clause in the Associate Agreement entered into on January 20, 2020.” According to section 34(3) of the Working for Workers Act, 2021, the new non-compete provisions were deemed to come into force on October 25, 2021. This represented an express legislative intent to make the new Employment Standards Act amendments applicable as of October 25, 2021, and not earlier. Therefore, according to the trial judge, “it cannot be said the provisions with respect to the non-compete clause applies to contracts of employment with non-compete clauses entered into before October 25, 2021.”

The Takeaway

Based on the above, non-compete clauses that existed prior to October 25, 2021, will continue to be enforced in Ontario courts notwithstanding new legislation prohibiting such provisions. They must, however, continue to pass the common law test for injunctions, which is not so easily met.

Non-compete clauses entered into after October 25, 2021, will inevitably be found to be unenforceable. However, some may say this is not good enough. It remains arguable whether the legislation should invalidate non-compete clauses existing prior to October 25, 2021 as well as after.

Healthcare Worker Terminated for Refusing Vaccine

Vaccine related decisions continue to be made as we move closer to the halfway point of 2022. We have discussed a number of these decisions in earlier blog posts: see hereherehere, and here, to name a few. Today we write about a decision made on April 4, 2022, concerning the vaccination status of a healthcare worker at the Fraser Health Authority (FHA), one of five publicly funded healthcare regions of British Columbia.

Fraser Health Authority v British Columbia General Employees’ Union: The Facts

The employee in this case was Ms. Capozzi. She had been working as a substance abuse counsellor at FHA since February 2014 and had a discipline-free record. However, Ms. Capozzi was unvaccinated, and she had “absolutely” no intention of ever becoming vaccinated. It was her view that the vaccination requirement was “unlawful”. This was unacceptable to FHA. The Provincial Health Officer of BC announced on September 13, 2021, that all health authority employees must obtain their vaccinations to be eligible to work. According to this order, Ms. Capozzi was ineligible to work because of her refusal to be vaccinated.

Ms. Capozzi was terminated on November 25, 2021. In her Union’s view, there was no just and reasonable cause for terminating Ms. Capozzi as reasonable alternatives, such as an unpaid leave of absence, was available. On the other hand, FHA argued Ms. Capozzi was terminated for just cause for dismissal due to her inability to work in compliance with the mandatory vaccination order.

The Arbitrator’s Decision: The COVID-19 Pandemic

Before turning her mind to the merits of Ms. Capozzi’s termination, Arbitrator Koml Kandola had this to say generally about the COVID-19 pandemic:

“For over two years, the COVID-19 pandemic has been an unprecedented health emergency here and across the globe. As a communicable disease, it has had far-reaching impacts, including serious health consequences up to and including death. It has taken a major toll on our health care system and staff.”

Clearly, Arbitrator Kandola regarded the COVID-19 pandemic as a very serious health emergency. Such a view obviously does not bode well for an employee wishing to remain unvaccinated. Arbitrator Kandola is not alone in this view. Other arbitrators, such as Arbitrator John Stout in his decision in Electrical Safety Authority (as discussed in this blog post), have also taken the view that COVID-19 is a serious problem and that vaccines are a necessary means of addressing it.  This understanding and perception of the COVID-19 pandemic formed the backdrop of the Arbitrator’s decision.

The Arbitrator’s Decision: Just and Reasonable Cause

Arbitrator Kandola was very clear in her reasons that the present grievance concerning Ms. Capozzi’s termination had nothing to do with the validity of the employer’s mandatory vaccine policy, nor the reasonableness of the policy implemented by the Provincial Health Officer of BC. Rather, Arbitrator Kandola stated this case was about whether FHA had just and reasonable cause to terminate Ms. Capozzi in the context of the provincial policy. There is no dispute the policy applied to Ms. Capozzi, as it applied to all health sector employees in the province. Under that policy, Ms. Capozzi is undoubtedly ineligible to work.

FHA repeatedly advised Ms. Capozzi of the requirement that she be vaccinated. FHA encouraged her on a number of occasions to obtain her vaccination and provided her multiple opportunities to do so. FHA provided Ms. Capozzi with express notice of the consequences of her failure to be vaccinated. In spite of all this, Ms. Capozzi remained unvaccinated and intended to remain unvaccinated in the future. In choosing to remain unvaccinated, Ms. Capozzi intentionally rendered herself unable to work.

Due to Ms. Capozzi’s own decisions, Arbitrator Kandola found there was “no path forward” in terms of continued employment. In her view, FHA had compelling reasons for terminated Ms. Capozzi’s employment, and she believed no lesser alternative was reasonably available.

In these circumstances, the termination was just and reasonable. Ms. Capozzi’s grievance was therefore dismissed.

Extended Reasonable Notice Due to COVID-19 Not Unique to Ontario Employees

In an earlier blog post, we discussed the potential for courts to increase the notice periods awarded to employees where they are able to demonstrate clear mitigation efforts notwithstanding the many difficulties arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. At least two Ontario decisions have confirmed this possibility: Kraft v. Firepower Financial Corp. and Pavlov v. The New Zealand and Australian Lamb Company Limited. A more recent decision now suggests that Ontario is not the only Province taking this approach to determining reasonable notice of termination periods.

Miller v. Luminultra Technologies Ltd.: The Facts

This is a decision of the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench. It concerned the termination of employment without cause of Ms. Miller, a 56-year-old employee of the Defendant employer. She was initially employed in 2014 as a marketing officer but held the position of Strategic Marketing Manager at the time of her termination in 2020. Ms. Miller, therefore, worked for the Defendant employer for just under six years.

When Ms. Miller was fired, she was offered a total severance of six months, inclusive of salary and benefits.

Was Six Month’s Severance Sufficient?

At common law, an employer has an obligation to provide an employee with reasonable notice of termination or pay in lieu of that reasonable notice where the employee has been terminated without cause. The goal is to provide the dismissed employee with enough notice to secure alternative employment. There is, however, no formula for determining what amounts to “reasonable notice”.  It must instead be determined with reference to each particular case. Factors which are likely to make securing alternative employment more difficult will often point towards a greater notice period being awarded in order to compensate for that increased difficulty. This is why, for example, we see greater notice periods being awarded to older employees, as it is assumed they will have a more difficult time finding new employment than younger employees.

Notably, Ms. Miller was dismissed from her employment approximately two months into the COVID-19 pandemic. As we are all well aware, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a damaging impact on the labour market. Many businesses have struggled and as a result have been unwilling to hire. According to the New Brunswick Court, Ms. Miller made “extensive efforts” to find new employment with no success. The Court acknowledged:

“While there is no evidence in the Record of the specific impact of the pandemic on Ms. Miller or the job sector in which she was seeking employment, there can be little doubt that the pandemic and the shutdowns associated with it would have had some impact on Ms. Miller’s ability to find new employment.”

The Court had to decide whether or not to extend Ms. Miller’s reasonable notice period as a consequence of her COVID-related difficulties in searching for new employment. The Court wrote:

“I agree with the reasoning in Iriotakis that the pandemic is one of many factors to be considered when assessing reasonable notice. I also agree that termination at the point in the pandemic when the Plaintiff was terminated would tend to “tilt” the reasonable notice towards a longer range.”

Based on the above, and in considering Ms. Miller’s age and length of service, the Court determined the reasonable notice period in her case to be ten months. This is an extension of two months over the approximate average of eight months for individuals in Ms. Miller’s circumstances.

One Unlikely Story, One Voluntary Resignation

In an earlier blog post, we discussed the possibility of employees rescinding, or “taking back”, their resignations. Much of that discussion focused on what makes a resignation valid. In a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court, the issue of whether a resignation was indeed valid or not was raised once again.

Miller v Ontario Potato Distribution Inc.: The Facts

The Plaintiff employee in this case worked for the Defendant as a “lumper”. He had been with the Defendant for approximately 11.5 years. On April 29, 2020, the Plaintiff verbally resigned from his employment in the middle of his shift and signed a written confirmation of his resignation.

Why had he resigned? According to the Plaintiff, he resigned after a threatening incident led to him feeling unsafe in the workplace. In his view, the incident was evidence of a hostile environment that gave rise not to resignation but to a constructive dismissal.

What had made the Plaintiff feel so unsafe at work? He explained that on the morning of his resignation or constructive dismissal, he was led outside by a supervisor to a mysterious car parked in the parking lot. Outside the vehicle was, as the Plaintiff described, a “very tall man in a trench coat.” According to the Plaintiff, the man said he knew about the text messages the Plaintiff had been sending to a supervisor named Kim, and told him “it stops now and when your program is over so are your benefits.” The man then allegedly pointed his fingers in the Plaintiff’s face “like a gun.” When the Plaintiff told his supervisor he no longer felt safe at the facility, he was forced to sign a document and leave.

The Defendant’s Version of Events

The Defendant told a very different story about what happened that day. It was the Defendant’s evidence that the Plaintiff was not led outside by a supervisor and directed to approach a mysterious car. Rather, the supervisor had simply sent the Plaintiff outside for a customary smoke break because he was a smoker. He was never instructed to do anything further. The supervisor did not even go outside with the Plaintiff.

When the Plaintiff returned from his smoke break, he approached the supervisor and sad he “could not do it anymore” but did not explain. The Plaintiff then asked for a resignation form, which the supervisor provided. The Plaintiff signed it and did not seem confused about what he was signing.

Who Did the Court Believe?

The burden of proof rested with the Plaintiff to establish on a balance of probabilities that the parking lot incidence actually occurred and that the Defendant was involved in it or directed it. Ultimately, the Court held the Plaintiff failed in discharging his onus.

The Court assessed the Plaintiff’s credibility with reference to an often cited decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Faryna v. Chorny, which provides:

“The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions …”

Ultimately, the Court did not believe the Plaintiff’s version of fact was in “harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions.” The Plaintiff therefore failed to discharge his burden of proving that the events alleged actually occurred. As such, the Court could not find that he had been constructively dismissed.

What Does This Mean For His “Resignation”?

In order to be valid and enforceable, a resignation must be clear and unequivocal. It must objectively reflect an intention to resign, or conduct evidencing such an intention to resign. It must be voluntary. If a resignation is made in a spontaneous outburst during a highly emotional situation, its voluntariness may be in doubt. Furthermore, a resignation may actually be “taken back” by the resigning employee if the employer had not yet relied on the resignation to its detriment.

However, because the authenticity of the Plaintiff’s alleged parking lot encounter had been disproven, the voluntariness of the Plaintiff’s resignation could not be said to have been made during a highly emotional situation. The Plaintiff did not resign under any duress. His resignation, therefore, must have been voluntary. At no point afterward did he seek to take back his resignation.

As a consequence of all the above, the Court held the Plaintiff to have voluntarily resigned.

Threats in the Workplace: Cause for Termination

Workplace violence, as defined under the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act, includes not only physical violence but also statements or behaviour that can be interpreted as threats of violence. The Act further imposes an obligation on employers to take every precaution reasonable in the circumstances for the protection of a worker. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that making threats of violence in the workplace may constitute just cause for dismissal. This holds true not only in Ontario but elsewhere in Canada, even in the federal context. The Canada Labour Code, for example, strictly prohibits workplace violence.

For one banking employee, this lesson was learned the hard way.

Awuah v. Bank of Nova Scotia: The Facts

The employee in this case was a rather disgruntled bank employee. He was very unhappy with his job – he did not like the customers, the Branch Manager, or his direct supervisor. He made little effort to hide the fact. He was a little too candid in one of his conversations with a co-worker. In discussing his work with the co-worker, the employee allegedly stated: “I am so mad right now, I could just shoot someone.” He doubled down on the statement, further adding: “I am serious, if I had a gun right now I would shoot someone, I would shoot everyone.”

His co-worker took these comments very seriously.  They recorded in writing what the employee said and emailed the conversation to their manager. The employee was subsequently suspended without pay and told not to come in to work. The police were contacted.

The employee argued that he did not make the statements attributed to him. The police, after interviewing him, determined that he was not a threat. However, this was not enough to save the employee’s job. He was ultimately fired for cause as a result of his comments.  He did not return his keys, so it became necessary to re-key the entire office. Clearly, they continued to believe the employee posed a genuine risk. In the Bank’s view, “threats of gun-related violence [were] among the most extreme forms of threat and the Bank has an obligation to its employees and customers to take all necessary steps to prevent such conduct.” In the circumstances, no form of progressive discipline was required.

The employee, who denied ever making such threatening statements, sought a finding that he was unjustly dismissed and asked that he be reinstated.

Was the Employee Unjustly Dismissed?

The burden of proof lied with the Bank, which must prove it had just cause to discipline the employee and that termination was an appropriate discipline. This really depended on two things: had the employee made the threatening comments, and if so, was termination warranted in all the circumstances?

There was conflicting evidence over whether or not the threatening comments were made. The employee said they were not, the co-worker said that they were. It was his word against hers. In these situations, the credibility of the witness must be carefully examined. The co-worker was the only witness to the alleged statements. She observed the employee’s tone and demeanour and was alarmed by what he said. She did not believe he was joking. Rather, she believed his anger was very real. The adjudicator found her evidence compelling for a number of reasons:

  1. There was no dispute the employee was dissatisfied with his job at the Bank;
  2. There was no dispute the employee and the co-worker worked in adjacent offices and regularly consulted one another on client matters;
  3. The normalcy of the typical business relationship between the employee and co-worker was completely at odds with a level of animosity so intense that she would falsely accuse him of threatening to shoot others. The evidence of their relationship suggested there was trust and respect between them;
  4.  The co-worker’s recollection of the conversation was likely accurate because she had been alarmed by what he said and wrote out the conversation while it was fresh in her mind;
  5. The co-worker was a successful bank employee, early in a promising career, who had nothing to gain from falsely accusing a junior colleague of threatening violence.

Based on the above, the employee’s claim that the co-worker made up the threatening statements was “impossible to accept.” For that reason, it was held that the employee had indeed made the threatening comments attributed to him.

Was his termination an appropriate penalty, in light of the fact he made such statements? The employee was aware that his comments were contrary to the Banks’ policies on preventing violence in the workplace and he was aware that misconduct of this nature could lead to immediate dismissal. The employee failed to recognize the seriousness of this type of conduct. This did not bode well for his rehabilitative potential. Further, he was not honest when giving evidence at the hearing. His dishonesty raised doubts as to whether the trust necessary for a viable employment relationship could be re-established.

Based on all the circumstances, his claim of unjust dismissal was denied.

British Columbia Court Finds Employee Handbook Unenforceable

In a 2021 decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, Verigen v Ensemble Travel Ltd., an issue was raised regarding whether an employee handbook was enforceable such that employees would be limited upon the termination of their employment to the statutory minimum notice period as opposed to common law notice (which often far exceeds the statutory minimum).

The Facts

This case concerned the employment of Ms. Verigen, a 58-year-old employee working within the travel industry. The travel industry was of course severely and detrimentally impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. After a series of layoffs, Ms. Verigen’s employment was terminated as a consequence of the pandemic. Ms. Verigen then sought damages against her employer, for an amount reflecting a notice period of nine months.

Her employer argued in response that she had agreed to limit her claim to the statutory minimum notice period. They said her original offer of employment was made contingent on her accepting the terms of the employee handbook, which included a termination clause limiting her claim to the statutory minimum.

However, of critical importance to the ultimate decision was the fact the original offer of employment, made by email and accompanied by many other documents, did not actually provide the employee handbook. The employee handbook was not sent to Ms. Verigen. Ms. Verigen was only sent the employee handbook three months after she began working for the employer. When she finally received the document, she did sign it.

Was the Employee Handbook Enforceable?

Ms. Verigen, having finally signed the employee handbook three months following the start of her employment, appears to have agreed to the termination provision contained therein, limiting her entitlements upon termination to the statutory minimum. The key question, then, is whether or not the handbook is enforceable.

Ms. Verigen, in arguing that the handbook was not enforceable, stated the handbook amended her original employment contract without providing fresh consideration. Recall that she only signed the handbook three months after beginning to work for the employer. In considering this argument, the British Columbia Supreme Court referred to an earlier decision, Matijczak v. Homewood Health Inc., wherein Justice Verhoeven said:

“While the law relating to the requirement for consideration in order to support amendments to an agreement may be in a state of flux, it appears that the law in BC continues to require consideration where an employer seeks to impose an amended employment agreement with significant modifications, detrimental to the employee …” (emphasis added)

It is noteworthy that this also appears to be the approach taken by Ontario courts, as mentioned in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision Braiden v. La-Z-Boy Canada Limited.

In applying this reasoning, the British Columbia Supreme Court held that the employee handbook, as signed by Ms. Verigen after already commencing employment, cannot be binding on her insofar as it limits her claim on termination to the statutory minimum because no fresh consideration was provided in support of it.

What employers can take away from this decision is that if they wish to amend or add to an employment agreement, particularly where the amendment is something that is likely detrimental to the employee, they must ensure that proper and sufficient consideration is given to that new agreement, otherwise, they run the risk of it being unenforceable for lack of consideration.

Having found that Ms. Verigen was entitled to common law notice as opposed to the statutory minimum, the Court awarded her five months’ notice.